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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellant, 
vs 
Bernadette Duran , 
Defendant Appellee, 
Supreme Court No. 20051070 
Court of Appeals No. 20040421 
Criminal No. 031700152 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the faint odor of burning marijuana indicates an 
exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search of a 
residence. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
On September 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals filed its 
decision in State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409. 
On October 24, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court ordered that the 
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time for the State to file a petition for certiorari be extended 
to November 30, 2005. 
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on February 8, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
the State's Petition for Certiorari and directed that a Briefing 
Schedule be established. 
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) of the Utah Code Annotated, 
give this Court jurisdiction over these matters. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Constitution. Amend. IV. 
2. Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UT. Const, art. I § 14. 
3. Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the 
terms and circumstances of the case but without 
unnecessary detail. The statement of the questions 
should be short and concise and should not be 
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argumentative or repetitious. General conclusions, such 
as "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not supported 
by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The statement 
of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the 
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court. 
UT. R. App. Proc. (West 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
On February 8, 2006, this Court granted the State's petition 
for certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
below. This is Defendant's brief in opposition to the State's 
brief on writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Course of Proceedings: 
On May 3, 2004, the Trial Court entered its Ruling on 
Motions to Suppress, denying Defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence obtained through a warrantless entry and search of a 
friend's residence. R. 34. On September 29, 2005, the Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. State v. Duran, 
2005 UT App 409. On February 8, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court 
granted the State's Petition for certiorari on one specific 
issue; "Whether the detectable odor of burning marijuana 
indicates an exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search 
of a residence." Order of the Utah Supreme Court granting Cert. 
On March 31, 2006 the State filed its brief in support of its 
petition for certiorari. 
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Disposition: 
The Trial Court ruled that a landlord's consent to search 
the property of a tenant was valid as it was viewed through the 
eyes of the police officers. R. 34:2. The Trial Court did not 
consider whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
entry. R. 34:3. The State conceded that the Defendant had 
standing to contest the warrantless entry. R. 34:2. 
Ms. Duran was sentenced by Judge Bryce K. Bryner of the 
Seventh District Court in and for Carbon County Utah, pursuant to 
her conditional plea to serve a term of one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison on Count I and six months in the Carbon 
County Jail on Count II, to be served concurrently with any other 
convictions Ms. Duran was serving. R. 55. 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling, 
holding that, 
[A] s in South, the warrantless search of Horvath's 
trailer was not justified by the odor of burnt marijuana 
detected by the officers when they approached the 
trailer. Although the smell of burning marijuana 
provided the officers probable cause that a crime was 
being committed, it did not create exigent circumstances 
that would permit a warrantless entry. 
State v. Duran, 2005 Ut App. 409, P22, (Utah Ct. App. 
2005),emphasis added. 
Statement of Facts: 
On April 22, 2003, Eddie Horvath and his mother, Mrs. 
Horvath, contacted the Carbon County Drug Task Force. R. 60:16-7. 
Eddie Horvath informed the Task Force that he had witnessed what 
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he believed was marijuana being smoked in Lance Horvath's trailer 
residence. R. 60:17. Eddie Horvath asked the Task Force to be 
careful because he believed there were guns in the trailer. Id. 
The Police officers arrived at the trailer residence 
approximately 41 minutes after receiving this information. 
R.60:17-8. There is no evidence on record that the officers did 
anything more to corroborate the allegation that marijuana was 
still in the process of being destroyed. 
The officers did not ask whether Mrs. Horvath could enter or 
access the trailer at her will. They did not ask how frequently 
she visited or stayed in the residence. They did not ask if 
Lance had signed a rental agreement. The officers did not ask if 
she had any common authority in the trailer home. R. 60:18, 46. 
Instead they were simply told by Eddie and Mrs. Horvath that 
Lance Horvath was not in his residence. R. 60:19. 
Sargent Barnes testified that after discussing the issue, 
the officers came to the conclusion that nobody in the trailer 
would have standing to contest a warrantless search. Id. 
Furthermore, he testified that he preferred warrantless searches 
because obtaining a warrant was too much work. R. 60:94. He 
testified that the only probable cause that the Drug Task force 
had to search the home was that they believed there were drugs 
being presently smoked in the home. R.60:36. 
As the officers approached Mr. Horvath's trailer-home they 
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described what they were only able to identify as a faint smell 
of burnt marijuana emanating from the trailer. R. 60:19, 43. 
Without a warrant or consent, the officers entered and searched 
the trailer. They seized numerous drugs, drug related items and 
several weapons. R. 60:29,30,44. They detained and arrested the 
Defendant, Bernadette Duran, and two other occupants. R. 60:22-5. 
The record does not indicate that the officers found anyone in 
the trailer who was in the process of "smokin' up the evidence." 
At a minimum, 41 minutes elapsed between the time officers 
received the information from Eddie Horvath that he had witnessed 
drugs being smoked in the trailer and when the officers arrived 
at the trailer residence. R. 60:17-8. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is no distinguishable characteristic between burnt and 
burning marijuana that can be identified by odor alone. The odor 
of burnt marijuana, as decided by South, does not alone qualify 
as an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry into 
a personal residence. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 800 (Ut Ct. 
App. 1994)(Reversed on other grounds). An objective standard of 
reasonableness cannot justify a finding that the Carbon County 
Drug Task Force reasonably believed the faint odor they 
recognized was that of burning marijuana. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ODOR OF BURNING MARIJUANA IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE 
ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA. 
First, a discussion of the issue identified by this court 
requires an acknowledgment or a disavowal of the assertion that 
the odor of burning marijuana is indistinguishable from that of 
the odor burnt marijuana. The State has not identified, nor can 
it, a court or a case from any state or judicial body in our 
unified states or federal government that has made this 
distinction.1 
Furthermore, in all of the cases identified by the State and 
located by the Defendant that have considered the issue of 
whether the smell of burnt or burning marijuana constitutes an 
exigent circumstance to execute a warrantless search of an 
individual residence, the courts have either used interchangeably 
or without distinction, the phrases associated with the 
description of the odor of burning and burnt marijuana.2 It is 
obvious in this case as well, from the record below, that the 
Carbon County Drug Task Force and the Utah Court of Appeals also 
did not make a distinction between the odor of burnt and burning 
marijuana.3 
The State is asking this court to distinguish two types of 
odor-"burning" vs. "burnt". Brief of Petitioner at 9 and 17. The 
trial court's findings of fact and the record from the hearing on 
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Defendant's motion to suppress do not support this distinction. 
R. 34:2; 60:19,43. Furthermore, the distinction is illogical and 
unreasonable. The odor of smoke always lingers long after items 
are burned and, contrary to the colloquialism, the odor of smoke 
is not an accurate indicator of concurrent fire or burning. 
It would be error for this Court to hold that the odor of 
burning marijuana constitutes an exigent circumstance to the 
warrant requirement when the facts in this case do not 
substantiate a distinction between the two odors. Officer Barnes 
and Officer Anderson both testified that they only recognized the 
odor of burnt marijuana. R. 60:19-20 and 43. Nothing in the 
record suggests that the officers smelled the odor of presently 
burning marijuana or that they had the ability to distinguish the 
difference. 
Before this Court can reverse the Court of Appeal's 1994 
decision in South,4 it must do so under the standard explained by 
this Court in Mauchley.5 Id.; State v. Mauchley 67 P. 3d 477, 481 
(Utah 2003). The State has not made this argument or met this 
standard. 
II. THE ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA DOES NOT CREATE AN EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING A LAW ENFORCEMENT'S WARRANTLESS ENTRY 
INTO A PERSONAL RESIDENCE. 
In 1994 the Utah Court of Appeals held, " . . . whereas the 
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smell of burnt marijuana provided the officers with probable 
cause to obtain a search warrant authorizing a search of the 
constitutionally protected home, it did not, alone, validate a 
warrantless search." State v. South, at 799. In South, an 
officer investigating a possible cellular phone theft identified 
what he described as the heavy odor of burnt marijuana coming 
from inside a defendant's home and from the defendant's person. 
Id. at 797. The officer asked the defendant if he could enter 
his home. The defendant refused to give the officer his consent. 
Id. The officer then obtained a search warrant for the defendant 
and Dianna South and returned to the defendant's home with three 
other officers who all smelled burnt marijuana emanating from 
inside the home. Id. Despite these facts the court, citing State 
v. Dorson, explained that, 
[t]he police attempted to justify the seizure arguing 
there were exigent circumstances because the officers 
smelled marijuana coming from inside the house and 
because drugs are easily hidden or disposed of. . . . to 
establish exigent circumstances, the State must show that 
the delay attendant upon the application for, and 
issuance of, the warrant would likely have resulted in 
the removal or destruction of evidence. 
Id. at 800; State v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740, 743-44, (Haw. 1980). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in this case held that it fell within 
the purview of South. The officers recognized the faint odor of 
burnt marijuana emanating from the home after arriving at a 
minimum 41 minutes after a lay-witness reported what he believed 
was the smoking of marijuana inside the residence. They made no 
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attempt to obtain a warrant or substantiate the lay witnesses 
testimony. They entered the residence because they believed: 1) 
nobody in the residence had standing to contest the warrantless 
entry; 2) obtaining a warrant was too much work and; 3) people in 
the trailer were smoking up the evidence. R.60:19. The defendant 
did have standing to contest the search. R.34. Law enforcement 
had 41 minutes at a minimum to obtain a warrant. R.60:17-8 There 
is no evidence in the record that they even tried. The officers' 
belief that the evidence was in the very process of being smoked 
up was no more reasonable than the officers' belief in South. 
State v. South (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). 
The Defendant respectfully requests that the appellate 
court's order below be affirmed. 
III. THE OFFICERS' BELIEF THAT EVIDENCE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF 
BEING DESTROYED WAS UNREASONABLE. 
It was not reasonable for the officers in this case to 
believe that the marijuana odor they faintly identified when 
approaching the trailer home was that of presently burning 
marijuana.6 Contrary to the State's assertion, it cannot be 
reasonably argued that the officers, upon their arrival at the 
home, corroborated their suspicion that marijuana was still being 
smoked. Petitioner's Brief at 7. The Drug Task Force Officers 
arrived at Lance Horvath's home at least 41 minutes after they 
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learned of possible drug use. It is particularly unreasonable to 
assume that a person would be continuously smoking marijuana for 
a least 41 minutes without further corroborating information. 
After arriving, the officers did nothing to determine 
whether marijuana was still being smoked. The did not ask if the 
lay-witness had recently re-entered the home. They did not 
attempt to make contact with the occupants of the trailer. They 
did not request that the informant attempt to re-enter the home 
and investigate. Instead the only corroborating information that 
the officers obtained upon arrival was the faint odor of burnt 
marijuana. R.60:19-20, 43. 
As a Boy Scout home from summer camp can testify, the odor 
of smoke lasts long after the fire is out. It is objectively 
unreasonable to conclude that the faint odor of burnt marijuana 
together with a "41-minutes-old" report of drug use is evidence 
that marijuana is still burning. 
The Duran opinion does not stand for the proposition that an 
officer who observes and smells marijuana use cannot enter that 
home and preclude that person from breaking the law and 
destroying evidence. Petitioner's Brief at 16. For the purposes 
of this case, the Court of Appeals simply reaffirms that, whether 
marijuana was burnt or is presently burning, can never be 
accurately ascertained by odor alone.7 Therefore, it cannot 
qualify as an exigent circumstance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether the detectable odor of burning marijuana indicates 
an exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search of a 
residence is an issue that was decided by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. South on December 5, 1994. Id. The State has 
not requested that this precedent be overturned and the facts of 
this case do not distinguish between burnt and burning. A bare 
allegation that marijuana was burning 41 minutes before the faint 
odor of marijuana was identified, cannot create a reasonable 
belief that marijuana is still burning. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals 
decision below be affirmed. 
Th i s -ftpgjAr ( , 2 0 0 6 , 
Samuet-S:r:^^iley 
Attorney for the Respondent 
Endnotes: 
1. Petitioner's brief contains the following case cites: 
1) Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)(does not 
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor 
of burning marijuana); 
2) Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
3) Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana); 
4) Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (does not mention or 
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discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
5) Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1948)(does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
6) Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)(does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
7) Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)(does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
8) Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana); 
9) Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984)(does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana); 
10) United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)(does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana) ; 
11) United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana); 
12) United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 
(1972)(does not mention or discuss the odor of burnt 
marijuana vs. the odor of burning marijuana); 
13) Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana) ; 
14) Consalvo v. State, 372 So.2d 44 (1979)(does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
15) Mendez v. People, 372 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (The 
Colorado Supreme Court does not distinguish between the odor 
of burnt or burning marijuana. Although the Court refers to 
the odor of burning marijuana throughout its opinion the 
Colorado court relies wholly on State v. Decker, in which 
the Arizona Supreme Court held that the odor of burned 
marijuana constituted an exigent circumstance. Furthermore 
the officer upon entering the motel room from which he could 
smell burning marijuana did not find anyone who was in the 
process of destroying marijuana. It is also important to 
note that the Colorado Court place a heavy amount of weight 
on the fact that the arresting officer did not go to the 
motel with the purpose of investigating a drug crime and 
therefore did not have the approximately 41 minutes to 
obtain a warrant like the Carbon County Drug Task Force. 
Since 1999, the date this case was decided it has not been 
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followed or cited to by another Colorado case with similar 
facts) ; 
16) People v. Mcllwain, 281 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1967)(does not mention or discuss the odor of burnt 
marijuana vs. the odor of burning marijuana); 
17) State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987)(does not mention or 
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning 
marijuana); 
18) State v. Curl, 869 P.2d 224 (Idaho 1993) (The Idaho Supreme 
Court does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or 
burning marijuana. The officer upon entry into the room 
further more found no corroborating evidence to assert that 
people were in the act of burning marijuana. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that the smell of burning marijuana 
does not constitute an exigent circumstance. State v. 
Manthei, 939 P.2d 556 (Idaho 1997)(reversed on other 
grounds)); 
19) State v. Decker, 580 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1978) (The Supreme Court 
of Arizona does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or 
burning marijuana. Moreover the ourt uses the two terms 
interchangeably. Like the Mendez, the officer arrived at 
the motel room for a purpose other than investigation of 
drug activity.); 
20) State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409 (The Utah Court of appeals 
does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or burning 
marijuana. Moreover the court uses the two terms 
interchangeably. ) ; 
21) State v. Heikkinen, 765 P.2d 1252 (Or. App. 1988) (does not 
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor 
of burning marijuana.); 
22) State v. Hess, 680 N.W.2d 314 (S.D. 2004) (The facts of the 
South Dakota did not involve the identification of the odor 
of burning or burnt marijuana. The court does not mention 
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of 
burning marijuana.); 
23) State v. Kosman, 892 P.2d 207 (Ariz App. 1995) (The Arizona 
Court of Appeals relying upon Decker, does not distinguish 
between the odor of burnt or burning marijuana. Decker, 580 
P.2d 333.)) ; 
24) State v. Krukowskl, 100 P.3d 1222 (Utah 2004) (does not 
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor 
of burning marijuana.); 
25) State v. Ramirez, 746 P.2d 344 (Wash. App. 1987) (The 
Washington Court of Appeals does not distinguish between the 
odor of burnt or burning marijuana. The officer upon entry 
into the room further more found no corroborating evidence 
to assert that people were in the act of burning marijuana. 
The Washington Court held that the smell of burning 
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marijuana does not constitute an exigent circumstance.)/' 
26) State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994), (rev'd on 
other grounds), 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996)(The Utah Court of 
appeals does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or 
burning marijuana. Moreover the court uses the two terms 
interchangeably.); 
27) State v. Strange, 530 So.2d 1336 (Miss. 1988)(does not 
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor 
of burning marijuana) . 
2. The following are a list of cases that the Defendant was able 
to locate that mention the issue of burned marijuana and 
exigency: 
1) Cherry v. Commonwealth, 605 S 
2) Mendez v. People, 372 P.2d 27 
3) Rideout v. State, 122 P.3d 20 
4) State v. Akerman, 499 N.W.2d 
5) State v. Carter, 636 P.2d 460 
6) State v. Curl, 689 P.2d 224 ( 
7) State v. Decker, 580 P.2d 333 
8) State v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740 
9) State v. Halpern, 30 P.3d 383 
10) State v. Hess, 680 N.W.2d 314 
11) State v. Holland, 744 A.2d 65 
12) State v. Kosman, 892 P.2d 207 
13) State v. Pool, 652 P.2d 254, 
14) State v. Ramirez, 746 P.2d 34 
15) State v. Schwartz, 532 N.W.2d 
16) State v. Shur, 538 P.2d 689 ( 
17) State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 
other grounds) 
18) State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 
19) State v. Vanderveer, 667 A.2d 
.E.2d 297 (Va. Ct. App. 2004); 
5 (Colo. 1999) 
1 (Wyoming 2005); 
882 (N.D. 1993); 
(Or. Ct. App 1981); 
Idaho 1993) 
(Ariz. 1978) 
(Haw. 1980); 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001); 
(S.D. 2004) 
6, 662 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1999); 
(Ariz Ct. App. 1995) 
256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); 
4 (Was. Ct. App 1987) 
470 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); 
Kan. 1975); 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(rev'd on 
102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); 
382 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1995); 
3. The Carbon County Drug Task Force Officers at the suppression 
hearing described the odor they recognized as a faint odor of 
burnt marijuana while at the same one of the officers indicated 
his belief that evidence was in the process of being burned up. 
R.60:19 and 43. The Court of Appeals in Duran, used the phrase 
odor of burnt and burning marijuana interchangeably in its 
opinion in its recitation of the observation of the officers and 
the Utah Court of Appeals decision in South. State v. Duran, 2005 
UT App 409, 3-5, 20-22; State v. South, (Ut Ct. App. 1994). 
4. Defendant is specifically referring to the South Court's 
holding that, "the smell of marijuana provided the officers with 
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probable cause to obtain a search warrant authorizing a search of 
the constitutionally protected home it did not, alone, validate a 
warrantless search." State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799 (Ut Ct. 
App. 1994)(Reversed on other grounds). 
5. In State v. Mauchley, the Utah Supreme Court held, 
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a 
substantial burden of persuasion due to the doctrine of 
stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis is crucial 
to our system of justice because it ensures 
predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication. 
However, when we are clearly convinced that a rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will 
come by departing form precedent, we are not inexorably 
bound by our ow precedents. 
State v. Mauchely, 67 P.3d 477,481 (Utah 2003). 
6. Officer Barnes Testified at the suppression hearing that after 
arriving at the home approximately 41 minutes after receiving the 
phone call from Eddie Horvath indicating that he had witnessed 
what he believed was the illegal smoking of marijuana that 
officers decided that marijuana was still being smoked. 60:19. 
7. The State's oft repeated Duran, cite "Although the smell of 
burning marijuana provided the officers probable cause that a 
crime was being committed, it did not create exigent 
circumstances that would permit a warrantless entry, is much more 
clear when it is read in context of the preceding sentence and 
paragraph. Duran, at 22. 
The state argued that the smell of burning marijuana 
alerted the officers to the fact that a crime was being 
committed an that the evidence of that crime was being 
destroyed. The South court disagreed, 
The States concern that marijuana may be 
hidden or disposed or before officers obtain a 
warrant is outweighed by the concern that a 
warrantless search would violate the 
heightened expectation of privacy oi a private 
home. Thus we hold that although the plain 
smell doctrine provides officers probable 
cause to believe contraband or evidence of a 
crime may be found, it does not automatically 
provide officers with exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search of a private 
residence. 
Finding that the officers could have secured the home 
while they obtained a warrant, the South court concluded 
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that the search was unreasonable despite the odor of 
burnt marijuana detected by Officer Simonson. 
As in South, the warrantless search of Horvath's 
trailer was not justified by the odor of burnt marijuana 
detected by the officers when they approached the 
trailer. Although the smell of burning marijuana 
provided the officers probable cause that a crime was 
being committed, it did not create exigent circumstances 
that would permit a warrantless entry. 
Duran, at 21-2. 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. : 
BERNADETTE DURAN, ] 
JESSICA JOYCE SCHMIDT, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) RULINGS ON MOTIONS 
TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 031700152 
) Case No. 031700154 
1 Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
A joint suppression hearing for each of the above defendants was held on December 12, 
2003. At the conclusion of the hearing the court granted each of the parties time to submit 
written memorandum and instructed the State to file a Notice to Submit for Decision when the 
matters were ripe for decision. A Notice to Submit was filed with the court on March 3, 2004.. 
The court now issues its memorandum decision. 
The State of Utah in its memorandum concedes that both defendants have standing to 
challenge the search of the trailer on April 22, 2003. The court also finds from the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing that a warrant to enter and search the trailer was not 
obtained. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures. The court must 
therefore consider whether the warrantless search of the trailer occupied by the three defendants 
was justified under any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of first obtaining a search 
warrant. Recognized exceptions include consent searches; searches incident to lawful arrest 
based on probable cause under exigent circumstances; searches and seizures made in hot pursuit; 
searches and seizures of contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public; and seizure of 
evidence in plain view after lawful intrusion. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 at 855 (Utah 1992). 
Officer Rick Anderson testified that he was at Mrs. Horvath's home on April 22, 2003, when 
she told Sergeant Barnes that there were people in the travel trailer next to her home doing drugs. 
She showed the officers the title to the trailer and stated that she owned it. She then told the 
officers that she wanted them to go in the trailer and remove the occupants because they were 
doing drugs. Based on the written consent provided by Mrs. Horvath and detecting the odor of 
burnt marijuana emanating from the trailer, the officers entered the trailer. 
It is significant that at the time of obtaining the consent to search the trailer that no mention 
was made to any of the officers by Mrs. Horvath that she was renting the trailer to her son, 
defendant Lance Horvath, or that he was paying any rent. Although Lance testified at the 
suppression hearing that he had occupied the trailer for ten years and that he was paying rent of 
$100.00 per month, there is no evidence that this information was given to the officers by Mrs. 
Horvath at the time the consent was obtained. 
Although the court finds that Mrs. Horvath did not actually have "common authority" over 
the trailer which would authorize her to consent to the search of the trailer, the court finds that 
the officers reasonably believed that she had "common authority" over the premises when she 
showed them the title and told them that she wanted them out. The court therefore finds that the 
officers in good faith entered the trailer believing that they had legal consent to search. 
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990) the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that common authority is defined through the eyes of the police at the time of entry. 
The court therefore finds that in the instant case the warrantless entry as valid because it was 
based upon the consent of Mrs. Horvath whom the officers reasonably believed possessed 
common authority over the premises. Accordingly, the opening of the trailer door by Sergeant 
Barnes was not improper, and the discovery of contraband in the trailer in the ensuing search is 
not objectionable because it was pursuant to consent by someone who had apparent authority. 
Having determined that consent to the search was granted, it is not necessary for the court to 
reach the question of whether "exigent circumstances" existed. 
The motions to suppress are denied. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2004. 
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